First Circuit Extends the Community Caretaking Exception to the Home
Recently, the First Circuit held that police officers who engage in community caretaking functions on private property without a warrant are entitled to constitutional protection.
On August 20, 2015, a marital disturbance erupted at the residence of Edward and Kim Caniglia. Edward brought out a handgun from the bedroom, threw the gun onto the dining room table, and told Kim, “shoot me now and get it over with.”
Edward left to “go for a ride,” and Kim placed the gun in its customary place. When Edward returned, a second argument broke out, and Kim left to spend the night at a hotel. When she spoke to Edward later that evening, he sounded upset and angry.
The following morning, Kim was unable to reach Edward by phone. She called the Cranston Police Department, and asked that an officer accompany her when she arrived to the residence. Officer Mastrati met with Kim, and Kim described to the officer her interactions with Edward the prior day, including that he pulled out a handgun and magazine. She told the officer that she was “afraid of what [she] would find when [she] got home.”
Officer Mastrati called and spoke to Edward by phone. Edward told Officer Mastrati that he would be willing to speak with the police in person. Other officers arrived on the scene, went to the residence, and spoke with Edward on the back porch. Officer Mastrati later reported that Edward appeared “normal” and Officer Russell described Edward as “cooperative.” However, Sergeant Barth, the ranking officer at the scene, determined that based on the totality of the circumstances, Edward presented an imminent danger to himself and others.
Edward ultimately agreed to be and was transported by ambulance for a psychiatric evaluation. Edward was evaluated at Kent Hospital, but not admitted as an inpatient.
After Edward left, Sergeant Barth seized the guns in the Caniglia residence along with magazines and ammunition. Kim directed the officers to these items. Before Edward left the scene, he objected to the seizure of these items.
In October 2015, after unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the Cranston Police Department, his attorney formally requested their return. Edward received his firearms in December.
Edward filed claims in federal district court against the City of Cranston, Colonel Michael J. Winquist (Cranston’s police chief), and five Cranston police officers. Among his claims against the defendants, Edward filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, alleging that the defendants violated the Second and Fourth Amendments. After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. With one exception not relevant to the appeal at issue, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Edward then filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The court of appeals first considered Edward’s claim that the defendants offended the Fourth Amendment by transporting him “involuntarily” to the hospital for a psychiatric hospital and seizing his firearms after a warrantless entry to his home. Here, the defendants did not invoke the exigent circumstances or emergency aid exceptions to the warrant requirement. The defendants contended that both of the contested seizures were covered by the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.
The court explained that the community caretaking exception derives from Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady, the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of a disabled vehicle when the police reasonably believed that the vehicle’s trunk contained a gun and the vehicle was vulnerable to vandals. The Cady Court stated that police officers frequently engage in “community caretaking functions, totally divorced from detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”
The First Circuit stated that since the Court’s 1973 decision, the community caretaking doctrine has become a “catchall” for the responsibilities officers must discharge. The court has held that the Fourth Amendment’s imperatives are “satisfied” under the doctrine when police officers perform “noninvestigatory duties.” The court noted that officers enjoy a “wide latitude” in deciding how to best execute their community caretaking duties.
Until this appeal, the First Circuit only applied the community caretaking exception to the motor vehicle context. The court described the doctrine’s reach outside of the motor vehicle context as “ill-defined,” describing that several circuits have indicated that the community caretaking exception cannot justify a warrantless entry into a home, while other circuits have recognized that the doctrine allows warrantless entries onto private premises.
As a case of first impression, the First Circuit agreed with those courts that extended the community caretaking exception beyond the motor vehicle context. The court explained that because the core principle of the doctrine is to give police “elbow room” to take appropriate action when unforeseen circumstances present a hazard requiring immediate attention, the doctrine should not be limited to the motor vehicle context.
The court of appeals next considered whether the community caretaking exception extends to the police activity at issue in this appeal – the seizure of an individual whom officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe poses an imminent risk of harm to himself or others, and the seizure of firearms that the officers have an objectively reasonable basis for thinking an individual may use to harm himself or others.
The court found that the police activities at issue are a “natural fit” for the doctrine. The court explained that these activities are distinct from normal criminal investigation, stating that when police respond to individuals who present an imminent threat to themselves or others, they do so to “preserve and protect community safety.”
The court cautioned, however, that activities carried out under the doctrine must conform to certain limitations. The court stated that community caretaking tasks must be “narrowly circumscribed” in both scope and duration to match what is “reasonably required” to perform community caretaking functions.
The court then reviewed whether the defendants acted within the scope of the Fourth Amendment when they seized Edward and his firearms. The court found that the facts showed that seizure of Edward and the firearms was “well within the realm of reason” given the risk of immediate harm. The courts explained that the officers knew that Edward retrieved a firearm and implored Kim to shoot him, and that Kim was so disturbed she hid the firearm and spent the night at a hotel. The court stated that no rational factfinder could deem the officers’ actions unreasonable, and concluded that the defendants’ actions fell within the community caretaking exception and did not offend the Fourth Amendment.
The court of appeals considered Edward’s remaining claims, finding the district court did not err in granting the defendants summary judgment on them. The court affirmed the decision of the district court.
Read the full case: Caniglia v. Strom
This case law update was written by Michael J. Sgarlat, Associate Attorney, Shaw Bransford & Roth, PC.
For thirty years, Shaw Bransford & Roth P.C. has provided superior representation on a wide range of federal employment law issues, from representing federal employees nationwide in administrative investigations, disciplinary and performance actions, and Bivens lawsuits, to handling security clearance adjudications and employment discrimination cases.