Supreme Court Holds 'Miranda' Violations Don't Confer a Right to Sue under §1983
This case law update was written by Michael J. Sgarlat, an attorney at the law firm of Shaw Bransford & Roth, where he has practiced federal personnel and employment law since 2015. Mr. Sgarlat works with federal employees to respond to proposed disciplinary and adverse actions, and has experience litigating cases before the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board.
Last week, in a 6-3 majority decision delivered by Justice Samuel Alito, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer’s violation of Miranda does not provide a basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
In March 2014, Terence Tekoh was practicing as a certified nursing assistant at a Los Angeles medical center when a female patient accused him of sexual assault. Deputy Carlos Vega of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department responded to the allegation, questioned Tekoh, and Tekoh provided a written statement. During this encounter, Deputy Vega failed to inform Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona.
Tekoh was arrested and charged in state court for unlawful sexual penetration. At his first trial, the judge held Miranda was not violated because Tekoh was not in custody. This first trial resulted in a mistrial. On retrial, a second judge denied Tekoh’s request to exclude the confession. Nonetheless, the retrial results in acquittal, and Tekoh then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputy Vega and others for violating his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
Tekoh’s §1983 case, brought in federal district court, similarly resulted in two trials. When it was first tried, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Deputy Vega, but the judge concluded he gave an improper jury instruction and granted a new trial. On retrial, Tekoh asked the court to instruct the jury that it was required to find Deputy Vega violated the Fifth Amendment if it found Deputy Vega took a statement from Tekoh in violation of Miranda that was improperly used against Tekoh. The district court judge declined, the jury found in favor of Deputy Vega, and Tekoh appealed.
The §1983 case went before the Ninth Circuit. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, holding that the “use of an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal proceeding violates the Fifth Amendment and may support a §1983 claim” against the officer who obtained it. Deputy Vega petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the Ninth Circuit denied. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.
The question before the Court was whether a violation of the Miranda rules provides a basis for a claim under §1983. The Court held it does not.
The Court’s position rested on its finding that “Miranda did not hold that a violation of the rules it established necessarily constitute a Fifth Amendment violation.” The Court stated that “Miranda itself and our subsequent cases make clear that Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules.” While the Court stated these rules are “constitutionally based,” “they are prophylactic rules nonetheless.”
Contrary to argument made by the Ninth Circuit and Tekoh, the Court disagreed that its decision in Dickerson v. United States upset the “established” understanding of Miranda as a prophylactic decision. Dickerson involved a federal statute that overruled Miranda by making the admissibility of a statement given during custodial interrogation turn on whether it was made voluntarily. In Dickerson, the Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda by statute because Miranda is a “constitutional rule.” However, the Dickerson Court also rejected argument that the statute could not be found unconstitutional unless Miranda is required by the Constitution, explaining that “though not an explication of the meaning of the Fifth Amendment right,” the Miranda rules “are necessary to protect that right.” Here, the Court therefore found that Dickerson supports its position that “Miranda rules are prophylactic rules” that are “necessary to protect the Fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.”
The Court next explained that a judicially created prophylactic rule should only apply where its benefits outweigh its costs. As a result, the Court was required to determine whether it should be applied to permit the assertion of Miranda claims under §1983. In short, the Court stated that the benefits would be “slight” and the costs would be “substantial.”
The Court stated that Miranda rests on the purpose of suppressing at trial evidence obtained by compelled self-incrimination. “Allowing the victim of a Miranda violation to sue a police officer for damages under §1983 would have little additional deterrent value, and permitting such claims would cause many problems.” Some of the effects mentioned by the Court include judicial economy by requiring a judge to adjudicate a factual question already decided by a state court, or potential procedural issues like whether a federal court considering a §1983 claim would owe deference to a trial court’s findings.
Because the Court declined to find violation of Miranda to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and saw no justification for expanding Miranda to confer a right to sue under §1983, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case.
Read the full case: Vega v. Tekoh
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