Eighth Circuit Upholds Onlooker’s Right To Observe Police Activity
Onlookers have a right to observe police-citizen interactions at a distance, and an onlooker’s refusal to provide his full social security number does not create a basis for an officer to detain him.
According to plaintiff Kevin Chestnut, one evening while jogging in a St. Louis park, he stopped to watch Officer Leviya Graham perform a traffic stop and then resumed his jog. A short time later, Chestnut stopped again to watch Graham perform another traffic stop from a grassy area thirty to forty feet away and across the street from where Graham was conducting the stop.
Graham observed Chestnut and radioed dispatch for assistance, reporting that a suspicious person had been following her to her car stops. Officer Dawain Wallace responded to Graham’s call. Wallace testified that either Graham or the dispatcher told him Chestnut was “hiding in the treeline” and “peeking and lurking around a tree.” Conversely, Chestnut testified that he purposefully stood in a location where the headlights on Graham’s car illuminated him.
After shining his spotlight, Wallace approached Chestnut and asked him for some form of identification. Chestnut had none on him, so Wallace asked him for his name, address, and social security number. Chestnut gave his name and, he says, his birthday, but agreed to provide only the last four digits of his social security number. At that point, Wallace frisked Chestnut for weapons and found none. Wallace then instructed other officers who arrived on the scene to put Chestnut in handcuffs. After determining Chestnut had no outstanding warrants, Chestnut was released.
Chestnut sued Wallace and others in a Section 1983 action, alleging Wallace detained, arrested, frisked, and handcuffed him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. When Wallace moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the motion. Wallace then filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which accepted the appeal for review.
The Eighth Circuit began by addressing Chestnut’s claim that he was arrested. The distinction between arrest and mere detention is significant, the court wrote, because to conduct an investigatory detention requires less evidence of criminal activity than to arrest an individual. Analyzing Chestnut’s assertion that his interaction with police lasted only around twenty minutes, the court held his detention did not become an arrest.
Because Chestnut was only temporarily detained and not arrested, the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based on the attendant circumstances to justify Chestnut’s detention. In his brief to the appeals court, Wallace argued he conducted an investigatory stop of Chestnut for not having identification, following a female police officer, obscuring himself to watch her, and failing to cooperate with Wallace’s investigation by refusing to provide his social security number. The Eighth Circuit was not persuaded.
First, the court held Chestnut’s refusal to supply his full social security number to a police officer during a consensual encounter should not have contributed to Wallace’s reasonable suspicions. Second, the court held that whether Chestnut obscured himself in a dark area was a factual matter in dispute and therefore an invalid basis for Wallace’s motion for summary judgment.
The court then proceeded with a lengthy analysis denying Wallace’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his qualified immunity claim. Ultimately, the court held that if the facts were viewed in Chestnut’s favor, Wallace violated Chestnut’s clearly established constitutional right to watch police-citizen interactions at a distance without interfering. In support of its holding, the Eighth Circuit wrote that every circuit court to have considered the question has held that a person has the right to observe police activity in public.
Lastly, the court clarified that it does not hold that Wallace was prohibited from investigating Graham’s reported concerns, only that it was clearly established that Wallace could not detain Chestnut without more indication of wrongdoing.
The Eighth Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s denial of Wallace’s motion for summary judgment. The Eastern District of Missouri will, therefore, continue processing Chestnut’s complaint.
Review the full Eighth Circuit opinion: Chestnut v. Wallace, et al.
This case law update was written by James P. Garay Heelan, Associate Attorney, Shaw Bransford & Roth, PC.
For thirty years, Shaw Bransford & Roth P.C. has provided superior representation on a wide range of federal employment law issues, from representing federal employees nationwide in administrative investigations, disciplinary and performance actions, and Bivens lawsuits, to handling security clearance adjudications and employment discrimination cases.