Seventh Circuit: Independent Grounds Needed to Prolong a Pretextual Stop
This case law update was written by Michael J. Sgarlat, an attorney at the law firm of Shaw Bransford & Roth, where he has practiced federal personnel and employment law since 2015. Mr. Sgarlat works with federal employees to respond to proposed disciplinary and adverse actions, and has experience litigating cases before the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board.
On June 25, 2018, Illinois State Trooper Clayton Chapman was on highway patrol duties and received a message from Deputy Sheriff Derek Suttles about a hatchback with a California license plate on Interstate 72. Deputy Suttles reported to Trooper Chapman that the vehicle was going approximately 20 mph under the speed limit, and found it suspicious.
Defendant Janhoi Cole was driving the vehicle, and Trooper Chapman spotted it on the road. Trooper Chapman trailed the vehicle, hoping to stop Cole with a traffic violation. Trooper Chapman then observed Cole tailgating another vehicle that cut him off. As a result, Trooper Chapman pulled Cole over, requested Cole’s driver’s license and vehicle registration, and ordered him to exit the vehicle and sit in the front seat of the police cruiser.
The initial roadside stop lasted 10 minutes. Trooper Chapman asked Cole about his state of residence, employment, travel history and plans, vehicle history, and registration information. Cole claimed to be on a long road trip from Maryland to Cincinnati to Colorado, and back. Trooper Chapman told Cole he would issue to Cole a warning, but that he preferred to go to a nearby gas station to complete the paperwork as he was concerned about their safety on the side of the road. But this was not entirely true, as Trooper Chapman later testified that he had already decided he would not let Cole go until he searched the vehicle for drugs.
On the drive to the gas station, Trooper Chapman radioed to request a drug-sniffing dog. When they got to the gas station, Trooper Chapman learned on the radio that Cole had been arrested for drug crimes 15 years earlier, and then interrogated Cole again. He later told Cole he was not free to leave because he suspected Cole was transporting drugs. Another 10 minutes went by, and a drug sniffing dog arrived on the scene and alerted the officers of the presence of drugs. This resulted in the finding of several kilograms of methamphetamine and heroin. Cole was arrested.
After Cole was indicted on two counts of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, he moved to suppress the evidence against him. The magistrate judge did not address whether Trooper Chapman prolonged the stop initially to question Cole on topics unrelated to the pretextual basis for the stop. The magistrate judge denied the motion to suppress. Cole appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The court of appeals described the appeal as a “niche in Fourth Amendment law governing pretextual traffic stops.” As described by the court, officers may stop and detain drivers where such a stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and such stops are analyzed under the constitutional framework for Terry stops. That is, “[a] lesser seizure, such as a brief, investigatory stop, may be based on a mere reasonable suspicion, supported by ‘specific and articulable facts,’ that the subject is engaged in criminal activity.’” And, as the court explained, a traffic stop may be prolonged upon a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances” and ask whether the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that warrant the intrusion.
Here, the court broke down the various events that led to the search and seizure of drugs. First, was the initial stop. The court found no basis to overturn the magistrate judge’s finding that Trooper Chapman had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop for tailgating.
Next, the court looked at the interrogation at the side of the road. The court explained that Trooper Chapman’s legal authority to pull over Cole did not give the officer license to detain Cole for a speculative search or interrogation for evidence of “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Per the court, Trooper Chapman slow-walked the stop, and already knew the answers to the questions he was asking Cole, including that the car was registered and there was insurance for it on file. Of the over 8 minutes that the officer had Cole in the cruiser, he spent 6 minutes questioning Cole about topics beyond the limited scope justified by the traffic stop.
The court said the initial roadside questioning that prolonged the stop without the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to justify the delay. The court explained that Trooper Chapman had “at best only a hunch” that Cole was a drug courier based on a tip, “but a police officer cannot launder such flimsy speculation into reasonable suspicion through the mere act of voicing a hunch to another officer.” Outside of Deputy Suttles’ guess, the court said that Trooper Chapman had no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing that could support a seizure, “a restraint on Mr. Cole’s liberty.”
The court further explained that if the officer developed grounds for continued detention while carrying out permissible tasks, he could have justified the detention. The court found Trooper Chapman’s pretext to be “paper-thin,” and went beyond the permissible scope of the stop “almost immediately.” Ultimately, Trooper Chapman prolonged the stop to investigate possible additional crimes without reasonable suspicion.
The court reversed the denial of Cole’s motion to suppress, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Read the full case: United States v. Cole
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