Tenth Circuit Finds Probable Cause to Enter Defendant’s Trailer and Execute Arrest Warrant
This case law update was written by Michael J. Sgarlat, an attorney at the law firm of Shaw Bransford & Roth, where he has practiced federal personnel and employment law since 2015. Mr. Sgarlat works with federal employees to respond to proposed disciplinary and adverse actions, and has experience litigating cases before the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board.
On August 1, 2013, FBI Special Agent Bryan Acee was undercover and observed Matthew Maley engage in a drug deal out of his travel trailer in an RV park in Las Cruces, NM. Acee also observed a green Range Rover and a black Dodge pickup truck nearby. Officers performed a background check on Maley and found that he was a convicted felon on probation.
In November 2013, officers returned to the RV park in advance of a scheduled grand jury proceeding. Maley was not there. He moved out late August, after he completed probation. Maley was indicted and an arrest warrant was issued based on the drug deal Acee observed in August.
Officers learned Maley applied for an Arizona ID card with a Tucson address, and used that address to register several vehicles. An agent went to the addressed and spotted the travel trailer and pickup truck. Maley’s wife lived at the address, and her double-wide trailer was parked there.
On November 17, 2013, officers arrived at the address to make the arrest. The travel trailer was on blocks, its awnings were up, stairs were down, and it was fully hooked up to utilities. At the time the officers arrived, Maley’s two adult sons were working on a car, and shouted towards the wife’s double-wide trailer. The officers searched the double-wide trailer, but no one was there.
The officers then worked their way to the travel trailer, knocked on the door, and received no response. The officers did not have a search warrant for the trailer. But they then entered the trailer. Maley was not in the trailer. But in their search for him, they found a shotgun in plain view and other hidden firearms. The officers seized the trailer, towed it to the FBI office, and secured a search warrant.
Maley was charged with offenses in both New Mexico and Arizona. In both, Maley faced charges related to evidence found in the travel trailer. In a New Mexico district court, Maley’s New Mexico counsel did not file a motion to suppress. He was convicted on various conspiracy and drug offenses and possession of a firearm by a felon. In an Arizona district court, Maley’s Arizona counsel filed a motion to suppress that was granted, and the charges were dismissed.
In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate or set aside his sentence before the New Mexico district court, he argued that had his counsel in the New Mexico proceeding filed a motion to suppress, it would have been granted and he would not have been convicted on the felon in possession of a firearm count.
The New Mexico district court denied the motion, and granted a certificate of appealability on (1) whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe Maley would be found in the trailer, and (2) if probable cause was absent, whether the failure of Maley’s New Mexico counsel to seek suppression of the evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first addressed whether Maley was prejudiced by counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress, and agreed with the district court that he was not. The court stated that to show prejudice, a defendant must show “his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.”
Here, officers found a shotgun in plain view upon their entrance to the trailer. Because this was enough to convict Maley, he needed to show the court that the initial entry to the trailer violated the Fourth Amendment. Notably, the officers had an arrest warrant for Maley, but not a search warrant for his trailer. Under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980), the officers could only have entered the travel trailer if there was “reason to believe the suspect [was] within.”
However, there is a circuit split over the meaning of “reason to believe” under Payton. The Ninth Circuit, which oversees the Arizona, the state where the search occurred, interprets “reason to believe” to “embod[y] the same standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause.” Conversely, the Tenth Circuit, which oversees New Mexico, where Maley was charged, interprets “reason to believe” to mean something less than probable cause.
Maley contested that the Tenth Circuit should apply the law of where the search or seizure occurred. The Tenth Circuit stated it did not need to decide this issue, as it found that the officers had probable cause to enter Maley’s trailer. The court of appeals stated that “[p]robable cause is not a high bar,” and only requires a “fair probability” that the suspect would be inside.
The court found the officers had probable cause to enter the travel trailer, as the officers had reason to believe Maley lived at the residence, Maley’s Arizona ID card and registration for the vehicles was connected to the residence, and the officers saw the travel trailer fully hooked up on site. Also, Maley’s two sons were shouting warning to someone on the property when the officers arrived.
Because the Tenth Circuit did not find Maley’s Fourth Amendment claim meritorious, it did not need to address whether his New Mexico counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the New Mexico district court decision on the § 2255 motion.
Read the full case: United States v. Maley
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